Liggaamlikheid en verantwoordelikheid binne die bio-etiek

Authors

  • L Du Toit

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17570/ngtt.2004.v45n3.a27

Keywords:

bio-ethics

Abstract

Embodiment and responsibility in bio-ethics The main argument advanced in this article is that a certain feminist-phenomenological model of selfhood, subjectivity and agency is preferable over the classic liberal (Lockean- Cartesian) model of the self understood as standing apart from its body and possessing rights in the body. The preference for the former model is illustrated and argued in the context of bio-ethics. The former model”s advantages lies primarily in the fact that it can deal with humans as embodied beings, as sexually differentiated beings, as beings that change over time, as thoroughly intersubjective beings, and as beings always already immersed in (and in fact born from) unequal relations of power and symbolic constructs.

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Published

2004-12-31

Issue

Section

Articles • Artikels