An empirically testable causal mechanism for divine action

Authors

  • Arlyn Culwick Independent Researcher

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17570/stj.2020.v6n4.a10.

Abstract

A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations that serve to “infuse” virtues and other attributes into a person. Such interaction requires that causal relations exist between a necessary being and the contingent universe. This paper addresses a central problem of special divine action: that the empirically identifiable causes of physical events are modally ill-suited for (and epistemically distinct from) the action of an eternal, non-composite, necessary being. Accounts of what brings about physical events are standardly empirical accounts, grounded upon experience of the world.

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Published

2021-01-22

Issue

Section

General Articles (articles from all theological disciplines)